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1.  Introduction 
On September 11
th, 2001 (hereafter 9/11), two passenger jets crashed into the World Trade 
Centre in New York, USA. A third plane crashed into the Pentagon and a fourth was forced to 
the ground near Pittsburgh. These events were the result of hijackings that are believed to 
have been organised in various countries around the world under the guise of al-Qaeda. They 
affected people’s perceptions of aviation safety which influenced people’s flying demand.  
This paper presents an empirical investigation into the probability that an individual 
stopped flying around 9/11; this is important as a) it captures the likelihood of demand 
cessation should similar events occur in the future, b) changes in the demand for one mode of 
transport have repercussions on the demand for other modes and c) the decision not to travel 
would have impacted on the demand for goods at destination and origin. 
The data was collected via a survey in summer 2001 with the purpose of identifying 
frequent flyers’ perceptions of aviation safety and from a recirculation of the same survey, to 
the same respondents, in 2002. With the events of 9/11 in mind, the empirical investigation 
seeks to ascertain whether a) personal characteristics are associated with higher probability of   2
flying cessation, b) factors influencing stopping behaviour differ according to country of 
origin and c) the importance of these factors changed between the two sweeps. 
 
2.  Theory 
Fear of flying has long been a topic of economic research,
1 and work often stems from the 
differences between perceptions and reality of aviation safety. There is an important 
difference between experts’ and the average consumer’s perception of risk (Slovic, 1990), 
which can be explained partly by the difficulty in communicating effectively heath or safety 
related issues. If the perceived risk of flying increases then the demand for flying is likely to 
fall. 
Ito and Lee (2005) decompose the 9/11 terrorist attacks’ effects into transitory and 
ongoing components of airline demand. Their principle conclusion is that the effects of these 
terrorist acts on global flying demand is subtle and complex, which depend crucially on the 
travellers’ perceptions of risk: differences in risk perceptions can generate important 
differences in demand patterns. Recent studies in industries other than aviation have revealed 
that factors such as gender, race, political worldviews, emotional state and trust are strongly 
correlated with risk perceptions; equally important is that these factors influence the decisions 
of experts (and frequent flyers might consider themselves as experts) as well as of lay-people 
(Slovic, 2000).  
The 9/11 attacks generated risk adverse choices and affected people’s flying demand. 
Dumont et al. (2003, p. 1512) suggest that if people can relate to those who perished then 
emotional reactions will have affected behaviour: “making perceivers’ Westerner identity 
salient will lead them to appraise the events as targeting both Americans and Europeans [or 
Westerners in general]”. 
                                                 
1 See Rose (1992) for a literature review and discussion of relevant topics.   3
An act of terrorism is just one reason why planes crash; accidents, freak weather 
incidents, pilot errors, radar malfunctions, electrical faults and mid-air collisions have all 
resulted in aviation fatalities. Recognising that the events of 9/11 could have been prevented 
by locked cockpit doors or ‘air marshals’ can influence one’s perceptions of aviation safety 
and the need to improve aviation safety. Air travel is widely recognised as being the safest 
mode of transport with one fatality per three billion passenger kilometres, but this is not a 
widely held perception. In what follows we seek to identify the effect that socio-economic 
and psychological factors had on the demand for flying around the events of 9/11. 
 
3.  Data 
The data employed in this statistical analysis comes from a questionnaire that was distributed 
in two sweeps, pre-9/11 (May/June 2001) and post-9/11 (February/March 2002). The data 
were collected via the International Airline Passengers Association (IAPA) website 
(www.iapa.com) and forms the basis of the Lawrence et al. (2006) study. The responses of 
520 people from 62 countries are analysed here, which represents the full sample of responses 
based on the competition of the questionnaires in both sweeps. 
Because of their familiarity with IAPA, the respondents are likely to be people 
interested in and familiar with flying and are more likely to have aviation perceptions that are 
relatively safe. Nevertheless this is likely to be a unique data set that can permit the 
identification of a) how the demand for flying altered around 9/11 and b) groups of people 
whose aviation safety perceptions were most affected. The appendix provides a breakdown of 
their county of origin. Data definitions are presented in Table 1. 
 
{Table 1 about here} 
   4
4.  Modelling Approach 
The dependent variable is whether the respondent stopped flying; it is appropriate to employ a 
logit modelling framework and assume a variance in the distribution of  3 /
2 π . The discrete 
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where the left-hand side of this equation is the log-odds ratio, Pi is the probability that the 
individual stopped flying, β are coefficients and xij are independent explanatory variables 
grounded in the two sweeps, i and j. 
The empirical estimation follows two strands: first we seek to ascertain whether 
certain personal characteristics are associated with a higher probability of stopping flying and, 
second, whether the events of 9/11 changed the importance of some variables. To test whether 
2002 2001 β β = , we estimate  it it X s β =  and employ dummy variables to identify whether the 
explanatory variables had different effects before and after 9/11. Hence we estimate the 
following model: 
 
2002 2 D X X p i i it β β α + + =  
   5
  If there has been no change in the parameter estimates between the two sweeps then 
the parameters on the dummy variables should be insignificantly different from zero. 






i i P P L  is accomplished by nonlinear 
estimation methods using STATA version 7.0.  
 
5.  Results 
Individuals were pooled to create the first set of results, which are presented in column 1 of 
Table 2. In subsequent sets of estimations the respondents are split according to groups of 
countries of origin. All regressions are ordinary logits where the dependent variable has a 
value equal to one if the individual can be identified as having stopped flying between the two 
sweeps and equal to zero otherwise; we explicitly assume that if anyone stopped flying 
between the two sweeps then this stopping behaviour is a direct result of 9/11. 
 
{Table 2 about here} 
 
Chow tests are employed to identify whether the impact of each variable was 
statistically significantly different in the second sweep (see Gould, 1999). All regressions are 
estimated and then reestimated following a general to specific variable deletion method 
applying likelihood ratio (chi
2) tests for excluded variables using group and individual 
variable deletions. The results for the reduced model juxtapose the full set model for each 
sample group in Table 2. All results were reestimated using the robust command to identify 
whether the errors were independently distributed; in all cases, the robustness checks indicate 
that heteroskedasticity was not affecting the results. 
In Table 2, the explanatory variables are grouped according to a) personal 
characteristics, b) personal flying characteristics, c) attitude to media sensationalisation of 
aviation incidents, d) personal experiences of aviation safety incidents and e) indirect   6
experiences of aviation safety incidents (i.e. respondents reporting that their immediate 
friends or family had experienced specific aviation safety incidents); explanatory variable 
groups d) and e) capture psychological effects. 
The results for the whole sample indicate the following. Personal characteristics were 
important: males and those with a higher degree were less likely to have stopped flying 
because of 9/11. Americans were much more likely to have stopped flying than non-
Americans. These results are in line with Lerner et al. (2003) who found Americans 
overestimated the likelihood of being hurt following 9/11. 
In all samples, not being relaxed on a plane had a negative and highly statistically 
significant effect. The negative effect from being higher educated appears to be primarily 
associated with those in the US and the UK. Whether this is because of the respective 
educational systems, the relatively flexible labour market or something else is worthy of 
further research.  
Europeans appear to have been influenced by their own experiences of low risk 
aviation safety events: having experienced a low-risk event increased their likelihood of 
stopping flying. The converse is found for high-risk events experienced by Westerners: their 
experiences of high-risk events, and the fact that they must have survived them in order to 
respond to the questionnaire, increased the perception of aviation safety and reduced their 
likelihood of stopping flying because of the events of 9/11; the opposite result is found if the 
respondent’s family or friend experienced a high-risk aviation incident. These results suggest 
there is a complex interaction of socio-economic and psychological factors that shape aviation 
safety perceptions and influence the demand for flying, supporting the results of Ito and Lee 
(2005) and Dumont et al. (2003). 
Interestingly, perceptions of the extent that TV and aviation journal sensationalisation 
occurred for aviation safety incidents did not affect stopping behaviour and this did not appear 
to have changed because of 9/11.   7
Of particular interest is whether the events of 9/11 changed the impact of any of these 
explanatory variables. In the majority of cases it appears that 9/11 did not change the impact 
of these explanatory variables on the likelihood of stopping flying, suggesting that the same 
types of people might react in a similar way should a similar event occur in the future. The 
exception is a media related variable: in sweep 2 (post-9/11), Westerners and US/UK 
respondents who perceived that TV news did sensationalise aviation safety related issues were 
less likely to have stopped flying. 
 
6.  Conclusions: 
This paper has presented an analysis into the probability of a traveller stopping flying because 
of the events of 9/11. The results suggest there are significant differences depending on 
gender, education and country of origin. Traveller’s direct and indirect experiences of low and 
high risk incidents affected the probability of stopping flying because of the events of 9/11. 
Little evidence is found of a change in the influence of the explanatory variables suggesting 
that similar reactions might occur in the future if similar events transpire. 
   8
References: 
 
Dumont, M. Yzerbyt, V., Wigboldus, D. and Gordijn, E. H. (2003) “Social Categorisation and 
Fear Reactions to the September 11
th Terrorist Attacks”, Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 29(12), 1509-1520 
Gould, W. (StataCorp) (1999), Pooling data and performing Chow tests in linear regression, 
downloaded from http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/awreg.html on 02/July/04 at 
14.45 GMT 
Ito, H. and Lee, D. (2005) “Comparing the Impact of the September 11
th Terrorist Attacks on 
International Airline Demand”, International Journal of the Economics of Business 12(2), 
pp. 225-249 
Lawrence, P.K., Schmidlin, M. and Webber, D. J. (2006) “Aviation Safety Perceptions: the 
Public Assessment of Risk”, Ashgate Publishers (forthcoming) 
Lerner, J. S., Gonzalez, R. M., Small, D. A. and Fischhoff, B. (2003) “Effects of Fear and 
Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment”, Psychological 
Science 14(2), 144-150 
Rose, N. L. (1992) “Fear of Flying? Economics Analyses of Airline Safety”, American 
Economic Review 6(2), pp. 75-94. 
Slovic, P. (1990) “The Legitimacy of Public Perceptions of Risk”, Journal of Pesticide 
Reform 10(1), pp. 13-15 




Respondents originated from the following countries (numbers of respondents from each 
county in brackets): Algeria (1), Argentina (2), Australia (21), Austria (5), Bahamas (1), 
Bangladesh (1), Belgium (22),  Botswana (1), Brazil (5), Bulgaria (1), Cameroon (1), Canada 
(5), China (3), Cyprus (1), Czech Republic (2), Denmark (9), Egypt (1), Finland (7), France 
(12), Germany (20), Greece (5), Hong Kong (6), Hungary (4), Iceland (3), India (28), 
Indonesia (6), Ireland (5), Israel (5), Italy (26), Japan (9), Jordan (3), Kenya (2), Korea (Rep.) 
(3), Kuwait (1), Lebanon (3), Luxembourg (1), Malaysia (11), Mauritius (1), Mexico (3), 
Nepal (1), Netherlands (30), New Zealand (4), Nigeria (3),  Norway (11), Pakistan (1), 
Panama (1), Philippines (25), Poland (4), Portugal (10), Russia (1), Singapore (10), Slovakia 
(1), South Africa (5), Spain (2), Sri Lanka (3), Sudan (1), Sweden (15), Switzerland (15), 
Taiwan (6), Thailand (2), Trinidad and Tobago (1), Turkey (5), Uganda (2), United Kingdom 
(151), United States (31), Venezuela (1), Yugoslavia (2), Zimbabwe (3)   9
Table 1: Data Definitions 
Names of 
Variables  Definitions 
Stopped  = 1 if they stopped flying; = 0 else 
Male  = 1 if Male; = 0 if female 
Age  = 4 if the respondent is aged over 50; = 3 if the respondent is aged between 36 and 50; = 2 if the 
respondent is aged between 25 and 35; = 1 if the respondent is aged less than 25; 
Degree  = 1 if the respondent has a university/college degree; = 0 else 
Higher Degree  = 1 if the respondent has a higher degree (Masters/PhD/…); = 0 else 
Travel Class  = 4 if the respondent travels first class; = 3 if the respondent travels business class; = 2 if the respondent 
travels premium economy class; = 1 if the respondent travels economy class 
Westerner  = 1 if the respondent is from an EU country, the USA, Canada or Australasia; = 0 else 
American  = 1 if the respondent is from the USA; = 0 else 
Frequent Flyer 
= 5 if the respondent makes more than 20 round trips per year; = 4 if the respondent makes between 16 
and 20 round trips per year; = 3 if the respondent makes between 11 and 15 round trips per year; = 2 if the 
respondent makes between 6and 10 round trips per year; = 1 if the respondent makes between 0 and 5 
round trips per year [Round trips can include several flight legs] 
Relaxed on Plane 
The respondents were asked their extent of agreement with the statement: “I always feel relaxed once in 
the aircraft”. The value = 5 if the response was ‘strongly agree’; = 4 if the response was ‘agree’; = 3 if the 




The respondents were asked their extent of agreement with the statement: “I usually fly on national 
carriers”. The value = 5 if the response was ‘strongly agree’; = 4 if the response was ‘agree’; = 3 if the 
response was ‘neither agree nor disagree’; = 2 if the response was ‘disagree’; = 1 if the response was 
‘strongly disagree’. 
TV Sensationalise 
The respondents were asked for their response to the following statement: “Do you think that TV news, 
such as CNN/BBC, tends to exaggerate or sensationalise aviation safety issues?”. The value = 5 if the 
response was ‘many times’; = 4 if the response was ‘sometimes’; = 3 if the response was ‘occasionally’; = 
2 if the response was ‘infrequently’; = 1 if the response was ‘very infrequently’. 
Aviation Journals 
Sensationalise 
The respondents were asked their extent of agreement with the statement: “Do you think that aviation 
journals, such as Aviation Week, tend to exaggerate or sensationalise aviation safety issues?”. The value = 
5 if the response was ‘many times’; = 4 if the response was ‘sometimes’; = 3 if the response was 
‘occasionally’; = 2 if the response was ‘infrequently’; = 1 if the response was ‘very infrequently’. 
Experience Low 
Risk 
= the number of experiences of the respondent of relatively ‘low-risk’ aviation incidents as a passenger on 
a commercial aircraft. These include: in-flight turn-back, turbulence, and unruly passenger behaviour. 
Experience High 
Risk 
= the number of experiences of the respondent of relatively ‘high-risk’ aviation incidents as a passenger 
on a commercial aircraft. These include: engine failure, lightning strike, aborted takeoff, failure of cabin 
pressure, and aborted landing. 
Friends / Family 
Exp Low Risk 
= the number of experiences the respondent reports his/her friends or family have experienced of 
relatively ‘low-risk’ aviation incidents as passengers on a commercial aircraft. These include: in-flight 
turn-back, turbulence, and unruly passenger behaviour. 
Friends / Family 
Exp High Risk 
= the number of experiences that the respondent reports his/her friends or family have experienced of 
relatively ‘high-risk’ aviation incidents as passengers on a commercial aircraft. These include: engine 
failure, lightning strike, aborted takeoff, failure of cabin pressure and aborted landing. 
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Table 2: Ordinary Logistic Regression: Who Stopped Flying?  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
All Countries  US and UK  Westerners  European (non-UK)  Variable 
Full Set  Reduced Set  Full Set  Reduced Set  Full Set  Reduced Set  Full Set  Reduced Set 
n 1186  364  860  436 
Male  -1.033 (0.301)*** -0.854 (0.281)*** -0.838 (0.704)     -0.803 (0.398)**  -0.751 (0.375)**  -0.888 (0.651)  -0.954 (0.555)* 
Age  0.139 (0.173)     0.374 (0.418)     0.026 (0.208)     -0.445 (0.313)  -0.499 (0.278)* 
Degree  0.490 (0.363)     0.158 (0.626)     0.516 (0.447)     0.153 (0.955)    
Higher Degree  -0.654 (0.252)*** -0.540 (0.238)**  -1.271 (0.602)**  -1.164 (0.545)**  -0.486 (0.303)     0.231 (0.451)    
Travel Class  0.184 (0.126)     -0.020 (0.273)     0.135 (0.151)     0.167 (0.224)    
American  1.166 (0.394)***  1.079 (0.381)***  1.954 (0.567)***  1.727 (0.492)***  1.212 (0.412)***  1.160 (0.398)***  -  - 
Frequent Flyer (01)  0.193 (0.098)**     0.203 (0.234)     0.213 (0.121)*  0.186 (0.098)*  0.162 (0.184)    
Frequent Flyer (DUM)  -0.178 (0.141)     0.030 (0.322)     -0.116 (0.172)     -0.377 (0.266)    
Relaxed on Plane (01)  -0.605 (0.189)*** -0.583 (0.130)*** -0.926 (0.395)**  -0.727 (0.270)*** -0.649 (0.222)*** -0.583 (0.153)*** -0.872 (0.356)**  -0.728 (0.212)*** 
Relaxed on Plane (DUM)  0.042 (0.261)     0.498 (0.571)     0.159 (0.301)     -0.273 (0.471)    
Fly National Carriers (01)  -0.283 (0.169)*     -0.004 (0.351)     -0.205 (0.198)     -0.498 (0.333)    
Fly National Carriers (DUM)  0.162 (0.233)     -0.403 (0.521)     0.167 (0.278)     0.513 (0.440)    
TV Sensationalise (01)  0.169 (0.163)     0.093 (0.333)     0.156 (0.193)     0.274 (0.318)    
TV Sensationalise (DUM)  -0.372 (0.231)     -0.751 (0.487)  -0.556 (0.293)*  -0.500 (0.269)*  -0.291 (0.175)*  -0.458 (0.422)    
Aviation Journals Sensationalise (01)  0.011 (0.176)     -0.013 (0.400)     0.005 (0.226)     -0.143 (0.351)    
Aviation Journals Sensationalise (DUM)  0.142 (0.236)     -0.060 (0.557)     0.082 (0.300)     0.534 (0.452)    
Experience Low Risk (01)  0.355 (0.228)***     0.119 (0.502)     0.321 (0.270)     0.645 (0.396)  0.568 (0.278)** 
Experience Low Risk (DUM)  -0.392 (0.298)     -0.751 (0.699)     -0.384 (0.375)     -0.319 (0.531)    
Experience High Risk (01)  -0.415 (0.181)  -0.215 (0.114)*  -0.100 (0.340)     -0.291 (0.202)  -0.243 (0.134)*  0.249 (0.304)    
Experience High Risk (DUM)  0.197 (0.234)     -0.343 (0.449)     -0.016 (0.269)     0.156 (0.420)    
Friends / Family Exp Low Risk (01)  -0.147 (0.210)     -0.511 (0.446)     -0.110 (0.247)     -0.109 (0.384)    
Friends / Family Exp Low Risk (DUM)  0.356 (0.289)     0.905 (0.598)     0.416 (0.347)     0.267 (0.538)    
Friends / Family Exp High Risk (01)  0.281 (0.159)***  0.281 (0.090)***  0.277 (0.332)     0.198 (0.185)  0.234 (0.104)**  0.144 (0.286)    
Friends / Family Exp High Risk (DUM)  -0.051 (0.209)     0.193 (0.436)     0.033 (0.242)     0.055 (0.381)    
Constant  -2.335 (0.483)*** -1.868 (0.286)*** -2.238 (0.889)**  -2.954 (0.311)  -2.737 (0.600)*** -2.179 (0.383)*** -3.404 (1.087)*** -3.019 (0.760)*** 
Log-likelihood  -291.054  -300.143 -71.522  -77.167 -202.152  -206.963 -91.712  -96.702 
Likelihood Ratio Chi
2  74.66*** 56.65***  33.85*  22.56*** 51.36*** 41.74***  35.05*  25.07*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.114 0.086 0.191 0.128 0.113 0.092 0.160 0.115 
Likelihood Ratio Chi
2 Test for Excluded 
Variables (Prob > Chi
2)  -  18.18 
(0.444)  -  11.29 
(0.938)  -  9.62 
(0.919)  -  9.98 
(0.953) 
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is Stopped. Standard errors are in parentheses. Robustness checks indicate that heteroskedasticity is not affecting the results. 